The Distributional Effects of an Investment-Based Social Security System by Martin Feldstein & Jeffrey Liebman
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
This is a revised version of the working paper 
that was originally distributed in January 2000.
THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF AN









This paper was presented at the National Bureau of Economic Research conference on Distributional Aspects of
Social Security and Social Security Reform in Woodstock, Vermont on October 23
rd, 1999.  We are grateful to
Jeffrey Brown, Glenn Ellison, Kathleen Feldstein, Steven Goss, James Poterba, David Pattison, Elena Ranguelova,
and other conference participants for discussions about this research, and to Joyce Manchester, Olivia Mitchell, and
Kent Smetters, . We thank Joshua Pollet, Peter Spiegler, Elizabeth Welty, and Ying Qian for excellent research
assistance. Feldstein acknowledges financial support from the Ford Foundation.  Liebman acknowledges support
from the Russell Sage Foundation and the National Institute on Aging. This research was conducted while Liebman
was also a Census Bureau research associate at the Boston Research Data Center.  Research results and conclusions
expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily indicate concurrence by the Bureau of the Census.  This
paper has been screened by a  Census Bureau employee to insure that no confidential data are revealed.
© 2000 by Martin Feldstein and Jeffrey Liebman.  All rights reserved.  Short sections of text, not to exceed two
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the
source.  Ssdist.09012000.wpd
The Distributional Effects of an Investment-Based Social Security System
Martin Feldstein and Jeffrey Liebman
NBER Working Paper No. 7492
Revised September 2000
JEL No. H55, I3
ABSTRACT
In this paper we study the distributional impact of a change from the existing pay-as-you-
go Social Security system to one that combines both pay-as-you-go and investment-based
elements.  Critics of investment based plans have been concerned that such plans might reduce
the retirement income of low-paid workers or of surviving spouses relative to what they would
get from Social Security, and might therefore increase the extent of poverty among the aged.  Our
analysis in this paper shows that this is generally not the case, even in plans that make no special
effort to maintain or increase redistribution. 
Our principal finding is that virtually all of the demographic groups that we examine
would receive higher average benefits under a mixed system with an investment-based
component than the benefits that they would receive under current Social Security rules.  There
would also be a smaller share of individuals with benefits below the poverty line.  While the
transition to a mixed system would require additional resources for the next few decades, in the
long run the extra cost of funding the mixed system – a three percent saving contribution rather
than a six percent rise in the tax rate -- is substantially lower than that of funding the pay-as-you-
go system.
Our individual-level data permit us to go beyond comparing group means to analyze the
full distribution of the benefits that individuals would receive under the two different systems. 
These comparisons show that the overwhelming majority of individuals would have higher
benefits with the investment based system than with the pure pay-as-you-go system. The
relatively small number of individuals who would receive less from the investment based system
is further reduced when the effects of the Supplementary Security Income program are taken into
account. These basic conclusions remain true even if the future rate of return in the investment-
based component of the mixed system is substantially less than past experience implies.
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The Distributional Effects of an Investment-Based Social Security System
Martin Feldstein and Jeffrey Liebman
*
In this paper we study the distributional impact of a change from the existing pay-as-you-
go Social Security system to one that combines both pay-as-you-go and investment-based
elements.
1 Such a transition can avert the large tax increases that would otherwise be necessary to
maintain the level of benefits promised under current law as life expectancy increases. 
According to the Social Security actuaries (Board of Trustees, 1999), retaining the existing pay-
as-you-go system would eventually require raising the current 12.4 percent Social Security
payroll tax rate to about 19 percent to maintain the current benefit rules or cutting benefits by
more than one-third in order to avoid a tax increase.  In contrast, previous research showed that
adding an investment-based component with savings equal to two percent of covered earnings to2   Ssdist.09012000.wpd
the existing 12.4 percent pay-as-you-go system would be sufficient to maintain the benefits
promised under current rules without any increase in tax rates (Feldstein and Samwick 1997,
1998a, 1998b). 
Most proposed investment-based systems would increase the link between a worker’s
earnings and the worker’s retirement benefits, potentially reducing the amount of redistribution
that occurs through the Social Security system.  Critics of investment based plans have been
concerned that such plans, even if desirable for a typical employee, might reduce the retirement
income of low-paid workers or surviving spouses relative to what they would get from Social
Security, and might therefore increase the extent of poverty among the aged.  Our analysis shows
that this need not be the case, even in plans that make no special effort to maintain or increase
redistribution, so long as sufficient funding is contributed to the investment-based component
(and current funding levels are continued for the PAYGO component).
To analyze the actual distributional effect of a shift to a mixed system of Social Security
funding, we use a rich data set of  government administrative records on the lifetime earnings of
a cohort of workers and spouses who retired in the early 1990s combined with a government
survey of those same individuals.  More specifically, we use the 1990 and 1991 panels of the
Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to Social Security administrative data on
earnings and benefits.  We simulate the impact of alternative potential reforms using the cohort
of individuals from the SIPP-SSA match who were born between 1925 and 1929 (and were
therefore between the ages of 61 and 65 in 1990) and present results in a way that can be thought
of as representing the impact of the reforms on the entire cross-sectional population of aged
Social Security beneficiaries at a point in time. We use these data to study who the likely future2Of the total 19.9 percent of payroll in OASDI costs that are forecast for 2075, 2.59
percent are for DI benefits, roughly 0.28 percent are for young survivors (including children), and
roughly 1.6 percent are OASI benefits at ages 65 and above for people who converted from DI
benefits when they reached the normal retirement age. The DI estimate comes directly from the
1999 Trustees’ Report.  The other two estimates rely on Table II.H2 in the Trustees’ Report
which provides projections of the number of beneficiaries of each type in future years and weight
these projections by the average benefit levels for each type of beneficiary in 1997 from the
Annual Statistical Supplement.
3 The additional resources could come from a temporary increase in the payroll tax or
from transfers from general revenue.  Feldstein and Samwick (2000) present a third mechanism 
– borrowing by the trust fund with subsequent repayment made possible by the returns to the
increased capital accumulation.
4 Thus total contributions in the mixed plan are 15.4 percent – a payroll tax of 12.4 (9.4
percent for retirement and 3 percent for DI and young survivors) plus the 3 percent for personal
retirement accounts.  In the long-run, this is substantially less than the 19 percent payroll tax that
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gainers and losers would be after a transition to such a system as well as to analyze some of the
options for increasing the progressivity in such a system that have been proposed in the recent
public debate on Social Security reform.
We focus our analysis on the benefits for retirees and their surviving spouses, excluding
disability benefits and benefits for children and non-aged parents. Financing this portion of the
overall OASDI program with pure pay-as-you-go financing would require raising the relevant
portion of the Social Security payroll tax from 9.4 percent today to 15.4 percent in 2075.
2   The
mixed system that we analyze leaves the portion of the payroll tax allocated for retirement
benefits at 9.4 percent and supplements this with a three percent contribution to Personal
Retirement Accounts that invest in a stock-bond portfolio.  While the three percent account
contributions require extra resources in the next few decades compared with a completely pay-as-
you-go-system
3, in the long-run they replace the six percent of payroll tax increase that would
otherwise be necessary.
4 We assume that the future pay-as-you-go benefits are reduced by thewould be necessary in total to continue the pay-as-you-go system.  In both plans there is also
revenue from the taxation of benefits.  In the mixed plan, we allocate all of this revenue to
finance DI benefits and benefits for young survivors.
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same proportion as the tax revenue (i.e., by 39 percent since 6 percent is 39 percent of 15.4
percent) and analyze how the sum of the remaining pay-as-you-go benefits and the Personal
Retirement Account annuities received by each individual compares to the Social Security
benefits that would be paid with the full 15.4 percent tax. 
We assume that worker’s personal retirement accounts are annuitized at the person’s
retirement date, using a single unisex mortality series for everyone.  Each spouse in a married
couples is required to obtain a joint and survivor’s annuity that pays the widow/er two-thirds of
the benefit the couple received when both spouses were alive.  We further assume that accounts
are split equally upon divorce, and that workers who die before age 65 bequeath their accounts to
their surviving spouse if they have one and to any other designee if they do not. The annuities in
our simulations are variable annuities that allow beneficiaries to continue to receive the same rate
of return in retirement as workers receive in that year. 
Our principal finding is that in the long run virtually all of the demographic groups that
we examine would receive higher average benefits under a mixed system with an investment-
based component than the benefits that they would receive under current Social Security rules
with a substantially higher tax cost.  There would also be a smaller share of individuals with
benefits below the poverty line than under a pure pay-as-you-go system that maintained current
law benefit rules. Taking into account the lower cost of funding the mixed system in the long run
– a three percent saving contribution rather than a six percent rise in the tax rate -- also implies
higher internal rates of return on the taxes-plus-savings in the fully phased-in mixed system than5 See footnote 3 above.
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on the taxes paid in the pure pay-as-you-go system.  Transition generations would also
experience higher retirement benefit levels than under current Social Security rules, and again
this would apply to virtually all demographic groups.  However,  these generations might also
face higher contribution rates.
5
Our individual data permit us to go beyond comparing group means to analyze the full
distribution of the benefits that individuals would receive under the two different systems.  These
comparisons show that the overwhelming majority of individuals would have higher benefits
with the investment based system than with the pure pay-as-you-go system. The relatively small
number of individuals who would receive less from the investment based system is further
reduced when the effects of the Supplementary Security Income program are taken into account. 
These basic conclusions remain true even if the future rate of return in the investment-
based component of the mixed system is substantially less than past experience implies.  We
repeat our analysis for various demographic groups and individuals on a “low rate of return”
assumption, i.e., on the assumption that the rate of return in the investment based portion is so
low that the odds are nine-to-one that it would be exceeded in practice.  Even in this worst tenth
percentile case, there are few individuals who would be significantly worse off under the mixed
system than they would be with the pure pay-as-you-go system.  
Note that by comparing the benefits under the mixed plan to the full Social Security
benefits promised under current law, we are setting a high hurdle for the mixed plan.  Many
proposed Social Security reform plans would reduce benefits compared with current law.  If we
were to compare the mixed plan to such a plan, the results would be much more impressive.6   Ssdist.09012000.wpd
We also explore two options for increasing the redistribution to individuals with low
incomes or retirees with low benefits.  We find that without any increase in the total cost of the
Personal Retirement Account deposits such a system can provide beneficiaries who have low
lifetime-incomes with the same average percentage increase in benefits as higher-income
beneficiaries, while still allowing most high-income individuals to have higher benefits in the
investment based-system than in the pay-as-you-go system.  Moreover, such funding of the
personal retirement accounts substantially diminishes the chance that lower income families will
have lower benefits than under current law in the case that financial market performance does not
achieve its historic average.
The paper begins in section 1 with a review of the basic economics of converting from a
pay-as-you-go system to a system that is wholly or partially investment-based. Section 2 then
discusses the data and technical assumptions used in our calculations.  The analysis of results
begins with the simplification of the extreme case of a pure investment based system.  Section 3
examines the effects of such a system on the mean benefits of different demographic groups, the
fraction of each group that would gain or lose from such a shift, and the effect on the number of
people who would potentially be in poverty.  Section 4 then goes beyond these averages and
proportions to look at each individual and assess the distribution of gains and losses within each
demographic group.  With this simplified extreme case as background, section 5 then examines a
more realistic mixed system in which the current 12.4 percent OASDI payroll tax rate continues
and is supplemented by a three percent saving rate in Personal Retirement Accounts instead of
the six percent tax rate increase that would be needed to fund current law benefits.  Section 6
then considers the effect of substituting a low probability poor return performance that has only6  Some academic demographers suggest that the needed tax increase could be even
higher (Lee and Tuljapurkar, 1998).  It is important to note that the tax increase is not a
temporary phenomenon associated with the retirement of the baby-boom generation; rather it is a
permanent change associated with long run demographic trends.
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about one-chance in ten of occurring. Finally, section 7 modifies the assumption that the Personal
Retirement Accounts deposits are a fixed percentage of each individual’s covered earnings to
consider PRA deposits that are either the same number of dollars for all participants or a
combination of a fixed dollar amount and a portion of earnings. 
1.  Investment-Based Social Security Reform: The Economics of Prefunding
The Social Security Administration Office of the Actuary projects that rising life
expectancy and continued low rates of fertility will reduce the ratio of workers to beneficiaries
from 3.4 today to 2.0 in 2035 and 1.8 in 2075.  This aging of the population implies that, in order 
to maintain the level of benefits promised under current law under a (largely) pay-as-you-go
system, OASDI taxes would have to rise from the current level of 12.7 percent of payroll
(including both the 12.4 percent payroll tax and revenue from the taxation of benefits) to 19.9
percent of payroll in 2075, an increase of 57 percent.
6 As we noted above, financing the current
law rules for retiree benefits alone would require increasing the tax rate by six percent of covered
earnings, from 9.4 percent of earnings to 15.4 percent of earnings. 
This large future tax increase (or the equivalent benefit cut) can be averted by prefunding
future Social Security benefits.  Prefunding involves setting aside resources today that would
otherwise be consumed and allowing them to accumulate until they are needed to finance
retirement benefits in the future.  The basic intuition is that a dollar in benefits 35 years from now
can be funded by setting aside a much smaller amount today.7  Poterba (1997) estimates that the pre-tax marginal product of corporate capital is 8.5
percent.  Since some capital may be invested in housing or abroad, the marginal product for all
capital could be somewhat lower than this.  In addition, the increase in the capital stock could
cause the marginal product of capital to fall.  Feldstein and Samwick (1997) show that with
Cobb-Douglas production technology, the reduction in the marginal product would be about 20
percent in the long run.
8Elmendorf and Liebman (2000) examine the impact of Social Security reform on
national savings.
9 See for example Diamond (1999) and the comments on it by Feldstein (1999).
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From the standpoint of the entire economy, additional savings today earn a real rate of
return equal to the pre-tax marginal product of capital, which is likely to be around 7.5 percent .
7  
Thus $100 of retirement benefits (in today’s prices) 35 years from now could in principle be 
financed by setting aside only $7.96 today , i.e., the present value of $100 in 35 years discounting
by a real return of 7.5 percent [$7.96 = $100 / (1.075)
35 ]. 
Four points about this rate of return are worth emphasizing.  First, the rate of return
earned through prefunding can be obtained for the economy as a whole only by increasing
national savings.  Simply shifting funds into private assets that would otherwise be used for
reducing national debt (as some plans for investing the trust fund in equities as well as some
carve-out individual account plans do) would simply move returns from the private to the public
sector without increasing total national resources.
8 
Second, all of the economic logic behind prefunding applies whether the prefunding
occurs through collective investing on behalf of the Social Security trust fund or through
individual retirement savings accounts.  While there are serious arguments both for and against
collective investing,
9 we believe that it is highly unlikely that the political system would adopt
the magnitude of prefunding discussed in this paper unless the prefunding occurs through private10  The low rates of observed savings by the current generation is not evidence that current
workers would oppose this transfer to future generations.  Private savers cannot (outside of tax
favored retirement accounts) earn the pre-income tax rate of return on their savings, thus their
savings is distorted by the income tax.  In addition, the need for a government provided Social
Security retirement system is largely predicated on the inability of individuals to make farsighted
savings decisions.
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savings accounts.  
Third, prefunding comes at a cost.  It requires the current generation to give up
consumption in order to make future generations (with higher standards of living) better off.  The
logic behind prefunding is that the high rates of return on additional savings imply that current
generations must give up only a little consumption to prevent future generation from giving up a
large amount of consumption.  Equivalently, if individuals today accept a slightly higher tax rate
than would otherwise be necessary, it will be possible to avoid a much larger tax increase in the
future.  Whether, this tradeoff is worth making depends on one’s view of the intergenerational
social welfare function (see Feldstein, 1996 and the explicit calculations presented in Feldstein
and Samwick 1997, 1998a) and the increased excess burden that would be caused by higher
future tax rates.
10
Fourth, part of the national return to incremental saving occurs to governments through
taxes. Even when those savings are invested in stocks and bonds in “tax exempt” personal
retirement accounts, a portion of the total return is collected by the federal, state and local
governments in the form of corporate profits taxes and business property taxes.  While in
principle these incremental tax revenues could be rebated to the investment-based Social Security
accounts (just as the Federal government transfers the income taxes collected on Social Security
benefits to the Trust Fund), we recognize that such transfers may be politically unlikely,10   Ssdist.09012000.wpd
especially with respect to the taxes collected by state and local governments. In the calculations
that follow we therefore underestimate the total return to the economy by assuming that the
investment-based Personal Retirement Accounts earn the return on a balanced stock-bond
portfolio, a return that therefore is after all taxes paid at the corporate level. 
More specifically, we assume a portfolio with 60 percent stock (the Standard and Poors
500 portfolio) and 40 percent corporate bonds, a balance that reflects the ratio in which
corporations finance their capital accumulation. The real logarithmic return on such a portfolio in
the half century from 1946 to 1995 was 5.9 percent. We subtract 40 basis points for
administrative costs to obtain the 5.5 percent real return that we use in most of our calculations. 
We discuss in section 3 why this understates the actual mean return since 1946.  In section 6 we
explicitly recognize the uncertainty of this return and analyze a low-probability “poor portfolio
performance” case. 
To assess the extent to which prefunding can reduce the required pay-as-you-go tax rate,
it is necessary to consider the implicit rate of return on the pay-as-you-go system.  In the long-
run, the pay-as-you-go system has an implicit rate of return equal to the rate of growth of the
Social Security tax base (Samuelson, 1958).  According to the OASDI trustees (1999), that tax
base will expand in real terms by about 1.1 percent a year over the next 75 years as labor force
growth averages 0.2 percent a year and real taxable wage growth averages 0.9 percent a year.
The comparison of the 1.1 percent growth rate for the payroll tax base and the 5.5 percent
rate of return on investment-based accounts shows the profound effect that prefunding can have
on the cost of financing future Social Security benefits.  Consider an individual who works from
age 25 to age 65 and then retires with a life expectancy of nearly 20 years.  To illustrate this, we11   Ssdist.09012000.wpd
approximate the costs of financing each $100 of benefits under the two systems by assuming that
all of the contributing or saving is done at the midpoint of the working years (age 45) and all of
the benefits are paid at age 80. With this 35 year time span, each $100 in retirement benefits
requires contributions to the pay-as-you-go system of $100 / (1.011)
35 = $68.18 or savings in the
investment based system of $100 / (1.055)
35 = $15.35.  Thus each dollar of tax required in a pay-
as-you-go system with a 1.1 percent implicit rate of return can be replaced by 15.35/68.18 =
0.225 dollars in an investment based system with a 5.5 percent rate of return. 
These calculations imply that the 15.4 percent long-run OASI tax could in principle be
replaced with a 3.5 percent Personal Retirement Account saving rate (i.e.,  0.225  x 15.4 percent
= 3.5 percent).  Alternatively, a pure prefunded system could use a saving rate that is higher than
this 3.5 percent in order to achieve a higher expected benefit, to provide a cushion against the
possibility of a lower than expected rate of return, and to ensure that even those individuals who
receive a higher than average return from the current Social Security system come out with
higher benefits under the reformed system.  Therefore, in this paper we assume a 9 percent
Personal Retirement Account saving rate, i.e., a rate that is only slightly more than half (58
percent) of the required long-run pay-as-you-go tax rate.
The relative cost of investment-based and pay-as-you-go benefits (i.e., 0.225) can also be
used in evaluating the mixed system by calculating the cost of avoiding the 6 percent increase in
the tax rate from 9.4 percent to 15.4 percent that would be necessary to finance retirement
benefits under the current pay-as-you-go Social Security system.  This calculation implies that a
1.35 percent Personal Retirement Account saving rate can replace a  6 percent increase in the
payroll tax rate. The analysis of the mixed system in this paper assumes instead a 3.0 percent12   Ssdist.09012000.wpd
Personal Retirement Account saving rate.  This is only half of the increase that would be required
in the long-run with the pure pay-as-you-go system but provides both a higher level of expected
benefits and a cushion against the risk of a lower rate of return.
It is important to emphasize that the analysis in this paper deals with only the long-run
situation in which the demographic change has increased the cost of the pay-as-you-go system
and the alternative plans are fully phased in.  In practice, of course, it would be necessary to go
through a transition period in which the population is aging and the new funding system is
gradually put into place.  Thinking about the pure funded case shows the nature of the transition
problem and how it can be solved in practice.  Nearly all of the 12.4 percent OASDI payroll tax
is currently needed to pay benefits to current retirees, survivors and disabled beneficiaries. Over
time this would grow to 19.9 percent if no investment based component is introduced.  The 0.225
percent relative cost factor implies that the 19.9 percent could be financed in the long run by
saving 4.47 percent of covered earnings. But adding that 4.47 percent to the 12.4 percent at the
start of the transition would no doubt be a politically unacceptable burden.  It is unnecessary,
however, to go immediately to the long-run funding rate.  A gradual transition is possible in
which the saving rate starts at less than its long-run value and increases gradually as the rising
level of investment-based benefits makes it possible to reduce the pay-as-you-go tax rate. 
Feldstein and Samwick (1997) show how the current 12.4 percent can be gradually replaced with
a much lower prefunded investment-based system by increasing the initial combination to 14.4
percent and then gradually bringing that total down to less than the initial 12.4 percent. 
The distributional impact during the transition period will depend on the exact timing of
the pay-as-you-go benefit declines relative to the distribution of the personal retirement account11Readers who are not interested in the technical description of our method can go directly
to the next section.
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annuities.  Throughout the transition a smaller fraction of benefits will come from the individual
accounts and a larger fraction from the traditional defined benefit Social Security system than
will be the case at the end of the transition. If the cuts in traditional Social Security benefits are
phased in at the same rate as the individual accounts accumulate, then retirees in the transition
generations will also have higher expected retirements benefits than under current law. 
However, some transition individuals may also pay higher total contribution rates than under
current law.  We do not consider any of these transition issues in the current paper.
2. The Microsimulation Model
11
As we noted above, our microsimulation model is based on a match of the 1990 and 1991
panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to Social Security
administrative earnings and benefit records for those same individuals.   We select SIPP sample
members who were born from 1925 through 1929, and construct lifetime earnings and marital
histories from age 21 through age 64 using the administrative records and the SIPP topical
module on marriage.  We then simulate the sample members’ Social Security benefit levels under
today’s Social Security rules (rather than under the ones they actually experienced), and simulate
their personal retirement account accumulations under the alternative policy rules outlined in the
previous section.
The strength of our simulation model is that it reflects the full range of experience of the
different individual members of an actual cohort, including periods of unemployment, child-
rearing, low-earnings, divorce, etc.  Because we have 40 years of actual covered earnings for12We ignore behavioral responses to these alternative Social Security rules.
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each sample member as well complete marital histories, we can be confident that our results
portray the full range of distributional outcomes that would have occurred for this cohort if it had
experienced these alternative Social Security systems.
12  Compared with other microsimulation
models used to study the distributional implications of Social Security reform, we rely little on
projected or imputed data.  Since we are particularly concerned about the lower tail of the benefit
distribution, our ability to observe extreme cases and to reflect the complicated cross correlations
between marital status, earnings, retirement, and mortality is important.
Our data have two drawbacks, however.  The first is that the future cohorts affected by
Social Security reform will differ along important dimensions from the cohort that we study.  In
particular, women in future cohorts of retirees will reach retirement having had much more
extensive labor market experience, and marriage rates will be lower, particularly in some lower-
income populations.  Second, we have to make some imputations to account for spouses who
were absent at the time of the 1990/1991 SIPP (due to death or divorce) and because our
administrative earnings data were truncated at the Social Security taxable maximum.  The full
details of our matching and imputation methods are described in the data appendix.
Once we have constructed complete earnings and marital histories, we calculate benefit
streams for ages 60 through 100.  We assume that sample members claim benefits at their actual
retirement age (obtained from the Social Security benefit records).  For the individual account
plans, we similarly assume that sample members annuitize their accounts at the same age that13  This assumption is made in order to facilitate comparisons between the different
systems.  In practice, it would probably make more sense to have a standard annuitization age in
order to avoid adverse selection problems.
14 Benefits vary by age because they can depend on whether the sample member’s spouse
has started receiving benefits yet.
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they chose to start receiving Social Security benefits or at age 65, whichever is earlier.
13  We then
calculate Social Security benefits at each age from 60 to100.
14  For married and divorced sample
members, we calculate separate benefit streams corresponding to the benefits the sample member
would receive if his or her spouse were still alive and if the spouse were dead (assuming that the
sample member were still alive). 
Using these benefit streams, we construct a simulated cross-section of Social Security
beneficiaries by treating each benefit-year as an observation and weighting each observation by
the probability that the sample member is alive in that year.  For married and divorced
individuals, the weights on each of the two benefit streams account additionally for the
probability that the spouse is alive.   We use mortality tables classified by age, race, sex, and
education thereby incorporating socioeconomic differences in mortality.  Brown, Liebman, and
Pollet (this volume) constructed these mortality tables by fitting a Gompertz-Makeham function
to data from the 1979-1985 National Longitudinal Mortality Study (NLMS) using non-linear
least squares.  The period life tables estimated from the NLMS were used to create mortality
ratios (at each single year of age) for each race-education-sex group relative to the overall
mortality rate for the relevant sex.  These ratios were then applied to Social Security
Administration life tables for male and females born in 1990 to produce the mortality tables used
in this paper.  Potential benefit-years with zero benefits are not included in the sample.  For15 We adopted this cross-sectional methodology after seeing a similar approach used by
David Pattison at the Social Security Administration.  However, our approach differs from that
used in studies such as Social Security Administration (1999) because we do not discount the
benefit levels back to age 65 as SSA does.  We believe that our approach better represents the
cross-sectional distribution of all beneficiaries and does not underweight older beneficiaries,
particularly older widows.
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example, only widows who take benefits at age 60 have observations at age 60.
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Table I displays two sets of means for our sample.  The first column displays the means
for our 2720 sample members, weighted for sampling and to correct for sample attrition due to
imperfect matching to administrative data.    At the time of the SIPP surveys, 54 percent of the
members of our 5-year cohort were female, 74 percent were married, and 92 percent were white. 
Column 2 presents weighted means for our simulated cross-section of beneficiaries.  Thus each
of the 2720 sample members contributes up to 41 observations from age 60 to 100 weighted by
the probability that they survive to that point in time.  As would be expected, due to lower
mortality rates of women, a higher fraction, 59 percent, of this simulated cross section of
beneficiaries is female.  The fraction that is married declines as spouses die.  Thus, in the
simulated cross-section of beneficiaries 53 percent are married compared to 74 percent at the
time of the SIPP, and 38 percent are widow/ers compared to 14 percent at the time of the survey. 
Similarly, the fraction that is black is lower in the simulated cross section because of higher
mortality rates for blacks than for whites.
3. A Pure Prefunding System
Although our primary interest is in the distributional effect of a mixed system that
combines the existing pay-as-you-go finance with an investment based component, we begin our17   Ssdist.09012000.wpd
analysis in the current section by considering the analytically pure case of completely replacing
the traditional pay-as-you-go financing with a prefunding system of individual accounts.  Since
there are different possible combinations of pay-as-you-go and investment based systems, the
pure prefunding system provides a useful limiting case.  It also exaggerates the distributional
effects and makes them easier to study.  
We follow the procedure described above to compare the benefits that the retirees in our
sample would receive in a pure pre-funded system (after it is fully phased in) with the benefits
that they would receive under the existing pay-as-you-go Social Security rules (which we will
refer to as the individual’s benchmark Social Security benefits.)  Our focus in this section is just
on the beneficiaries and the amounts of benefits that they would receive. In section 4 we combine
this information with the different amounts that these individuals would pay during their working
years as either taxes for the Social Security program or as savings deposited into the Personal
Retirement Accounts. This allows us to calculate the internal rates of return and net present value
for different subgroups as a way of assessing the net distributional consequences of the shift from
tax financed Social Security benefits to the funded Personal Retirement Account system.
Although a complete shift to a pure investment based system has occurred in several
countries, other nations have combined pay-as-you-go defined benefit systems with defined
contribution investment based prefunding.  A system that combines some prefunding with a
portion of the traditional pay-as-you-go finance would have a muted effect on distribution
compared to the pure prefunding system examined in the current section.  We examine one such
mixed system in section 5 where we assume that the current pay-as-you-go tax rate continues to
exist and that benefits are scaled down to the amount that could be financed by such a tax rate16 Although we do not explicitly model the transition to the pure prefunded system, the
mixed system that we study in section 5 indicates the nature of the distributional effects that
might be observed along such a path.
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with the older population that will prevail in 2075, the date that we use for comparing the two
systems.
16
Currently OASDI benefits are 10.8 percent of payroll (the fact that this is lower than the
12.4 percent OASDI payroll tax explains the existence of the Social Security surplus).  However,
some of these benefit payments are for disability benefits and other benefit categories such as
children and young widows that we do not model. Using numbers from the Social Security
Trustees’ Report, we calculate that the cost of the portion of the OASDI program that we
simulate in this paper will rise from 9.4 percent of payroll today to 15.4  percent of payroll in
2075.  The most direct comparison of the fully phased-in version of the prefunded system with
the existing pay-as-you-go system would assume that the retirees pay the same 15.4 percent of
their wages each year during their working lives under both systems, with those funds going to
pay concurrent benefits under the pay-as-you-go system and being invested in the personal
retirement accounts in the prefunded system.  However, since one of the advantages of the
prefunded system is that it would allow a lower rate of contribution in the long-run than the tax
rate of the pay-as-you-go system, our analysis assumes that individuals contribute only 9 percent
of their covered earnings to their Personal Retirement Accounts during their working lives.  This
represents a 42 percent reduction in the cost of providing for their retirement income relative to
the 15.4 percent required in the pay-as-you-go system. As we noted above, we examine the
implications of this for the internal rate of return and for the net present value in different
subgroups in section 5.17Administrative costs of 0.4 percent are about twice the rate charged by efficient equity
index funds like the Vanguard fund.  Bond funds generally have lower charges than equity funds.
TIAA-CREF now offers a variable annuity with an administrative cost of 0.37 percent. These
existing funds must incur expenses in collecting funds that would be avoided in a system in
which funds are deposited annually in individual accounts by the government.   For a discussion
of these issues, see the NBER volume on the administrative costs of Social Security reform
edited by John Shoven (Shoven, 1999) and the paper by Goldberg and Graetz (1999).
18The lognormal approximation for the rate of return implies that E(1 + R) = exp {E( r) +
0.5 var ( r) } where R is the level rate of return,  r is the logarithmic rate of return, E(x) is the
expected value of x and var (x) is the variance of x.  Since E( r) = .059 and var ( r) = (0.125)
2 =
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Our analysis assumes that individuals invest in a way that produces a 5.5 percent real rate
of return on their Personal Retirement Account contributions after allowing for administrative
costs of 0.4 percent.
17  As we noted above, 5.9 percent has been the mean for the period 1946 to
1995 of the logarithmic real return on a portfolio consisting of 60 percent stocks (the Standand
and Poors 500 index) and 40 percent corporate bonds. Four comments about this rate of return
are warranted.  
First,  5.9 percent is the return to investors on the portfolio of stocks and bonds and
therefore understates the overall return to the nation of  the incremental savings generated in the
PRA accounts.  To the extent that those savings are invested in corporate capital, they generate
taxes to the federal, state, and local governments, including both corporate profits taxes and
property taxes.  This extra tax revenue permits reductions in other taxes or increases in
government spending.  We make no attempt to calculate how this extra benefit would be
distributed in the population. 
Second,  the 5.9 percent mean return is the mean of the logarithmic annual returns.  The
corresponding mean return of the ordinary level rates of return is about one full percentage point
higher, or 6.9 percent.
18.016, the mean of the level return is given by E(1+R) = exp (0.067) = 1.069, i.e., a 6.9 percent
real level rate of return.  
19  Some additional variance could arise because individuals would be allowed to choose
among various mutual fund managers.  However, this additional variance would be quite small. 
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) estimate that the standard deviations of excess returns (relative to
the market) of large growth and income mutual funds is around 3.5 percent.  Since our estimates
use a market standard deviation of 12.5 percent, accounting for the extra 3.5 percent spread
would increase our overall standard deviation by less than 5 percent.
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Third, ending the post-war sample period in 1995 excludes the 125 percent rise in share
prices between 1995 and 1999 and the significant if smaller rise in bond prices since that time.
Extending the period through 1999 would raise the rate of return from 6.9 percent for 1946 to
1995 to about 7.5 percent for 1946-1999.  Understating the actual average past rate of return in
these two ways provides a margin of safety for the year to year fluctuations of the rate of return in
the future and for the possibility that the stock market is particularly vulnerable to a downward
correction at the present time.  
Fourth, we provide explicit calculations in section 6 of the distributional effect of a
prefunded system with a substantially lower rate of return, substituting 3.5 percent for the 5.5
percent. The statistical analysis reported in Feldstein and Ranguelova (1998) shows that the
historic experience implies that an annuity with a cumulative  rate of return higher than 3.5
percent would be experienced in 90 percent of the realizations from the process that generated
the observed rates of return between 1946 and 1995.
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Table II compares the mean benefits that would be paid to various retiree groups under
existing pay-as-you-go Social Security rules with the PRA annuities that they would receive from
the investment based accounts with the net 5.5 percent real rate of return. For each population
group we also note the percentage of beneficiaries whose PRA annuities would be greater than or20 If benefit levels under both plans are below the SSI guarantee, we treat the two plans as
providing equal retirement benefits.
21We simulate benefit levels under the current normal retirement age of 65, even though
we are considering a fully phased in system that would exist after the retirement age has been
raised to 67 (or higher).  We do this because we do not want to bias the results of our analysis in
favor of personal retirement accounts in assuming no behavioral responses to the benefit cuts
implicit in raising the retirement age. In doing so, we tilt our results in favor of the traditional
Social Security system, in assuming that the benefits we simulate could be afforded with 15.4
percent of payroll.  In fact, if the NRA of 65 were maintained, paygo Social Security benefits
would cost more than 15.4 percent of payroll.
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equal to the benefits that those individuals would receive from the Social Security program.
20 In
addition, we show the percentage of individuals whose benefits are lower than the poverty line
under the current law Social Security rules and in the PRA system.
All of these calculations assume that the beneficiaries begin receiving benefits at their
actual age of claiming benefits or at age 65, whichever is earlier.
21  The dollar amounts that we
report are per retiree.  This convention implies that a married couple receives twice the benefits
that we report. Under the Social Security system, the per retiree benefit for a married couple is
found by adding the retiree benefit of the primary earner plus the spouse benefit or the second
earner’s benefit, whichever is higher, and then dividing the sum by two.  In the investment-based
options, the Personal Retirement Account (PRA) annuities of both members of a married couple
are combined and the sum is divided by two.  Recall that the simulation assumes that retirees
experience their actual earnings histories, restated in 1999 dollars, and will receive benefits under
the current (1999) law benefit rules. When an individual reaches the age at which he claims
benefits, his PRA balance is fully annuitized.  Those individuals who die prematurely bequeath
their PRA balances to their spouse if they have one or to someone else if they have no spouse. 
All amounts are in 1999 dollars and wage levels.22 In comparison, the Social Security Administration reports average benefits actually
received by new beneficiaries (retired workers, husbands/wives, and widows) of $8000 in 1997. 
Accounting for wage growth between 1997 and 1999 would eliminate about one-third of the gap
between the two averages.  In addition, our simulation model assumes that workers faced a
taxable maximum that was equivalent to current levels throughout their careers, raising their
covered earnings relative to actual retirees.
23The two mean annuities could be made equal by cutting the PRA saving rate from 9
percent to just 4.0 percent, only about one-fourth of the 15.4 percent payroll tax needed to fund
the current law Social Security benefits with the future demographics and projected earnings. 
While it would be interesting to examine the distributional effects of the shift to a pure prefunded
systems with different saving rates, we do not pursue this here. 
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The top line of the table shows (column 1) that the average annual current law Social
Security benefit in our sample of retirees, funded with a 15.4 percent payroll tax,  would be
$9,291.
22    By contrast, PRA annuities for the same group of individuals with the same earnings
histories, funded with 9 percent of covered earnings, produce a mean annuity of $21,412 (column
2).  The mean annuity is thus more than twice as high with the PRA system as with current
Social Security rules even though the 9 percent funding rate is only slightly more than half of the
15.4 percent payroll tax rate required in the long-run for the pay-as-you-go Social Security
system with the current benefit rules.
23 Column 3 reports that 98 percent of all beneficiaries
would have  PRA annuities that were greater than or equal to the benefits they would receive
from Social Security under current law.  
Finally, columns 4 and 5 report the effect of the reform on the percentage of retirees
whose total income would be below the poverty level on the basis of their Social Security or
PRA benefits taken alone.   We say “benefits taken alone” to emphasize that this makes no
allowance for Supplemental Security Income payments or other sources of retirement income
(private pensions, federal and state government pensions, private savings, earnings, etc.) 24The amounts for married women are not the same as the amounts for married men
because only individuals born between 1925 and 1929 are included in the calculations.  Thus
both members of married couples are not always in the sample. 
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Columns 4 and 5 show that the Social Security benefits taken alone would leave 18.9 percent of
beneficiaries below the poverty line while this would fall to 9.2 percent with the PRA system. 
Thus PRA prefunding, using a saving rate that is less than 60 percent of the tax rate that would
be required for pay-as-you-go Social Security cuts the potential poverty rate by more than half. 
The rest of the table provides similar information for several different population
subgroups.  In every group, the mean PRA annuity substantially exceeds the mean benefits that
would be paid under current-law Social Security rules, the number of beneficiaries who would
receive more from the PRA annuity substantially exceeds the number who would receive more
from Social Security, and the potential poverty rate under Social Security rules is substantially
higher than it would be in the PRA system.  After commenting on some of these comparisons we
will look at a graphic representation of the outcomes for individual beneficiaries that indicates
the extent to which some individuals would receive less from the PRA system than they would
receive under existing Social Security rules. 
Although all of the subgroups do substantially better with the PRA system than with the
traditional Social Security, there are differences in the extent to which this is true.  Some of these
differences are what might have been expected, but we found others surprising. 
Married individuals gain relatively less on average than other groups. The mean PRA
annuity of $17,152 of married men is 2.04 times the Social Security benefits of $8,425 per person
for the same individuals. The ratio is similar (2.15) but not identical for married women.
24  By
comparison, the ratio of PRA benefits to current law Social Security benefits is 2.36 for non-25Note that although the per person benefits are higher for the single retirees of all sorts,
the benefits for the married couples with the man in the age range are twice $17,152 or $34,304,
substantially higher than the household benefits in the other groups. 
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married (widowed, divorced, or never married)  men and 2.56 for non-married women.
25   This
reflects two things.  First,  many married couples gain from the existing Social Security rule that
gives benefits of 150 percent of the benefit of the primary earner whenever that amount is greater
than the couple would have received on the basis of their individual earnings, even if the
secondary earner had little or no earnings.  Second, under the PRA system that we simulate,
women who become widows after both spouses claim benefits, receive a retirement benefit that
is two-thirds of what the couple was receiving.  In contrast, Social Security provides widows
with benefits that range between 50 percent and two-thirds of the couple’s benefit, depending on
the relative earnings of the two spouses.  Moreover, if the widow’s husband dies before claiming
benefits in the PRA program, the widow inherits the account balance and eventually annuitizes it
(as well as her own account if she has not previously claimed benefits either) at a single life rate.
This explains why widows and widowers not only have greater proportional gains but
also have substantially more per capita benefits than married individuals. Divorced individuals
also do well under the PRA plan relative to Social Security, especially if their former spouse is
still alive or if their marriage lasted for fewer than 10 years.  Social Security provides spouse
benefits to divorced spouses that are only one-half of the benefit received by the ex-spouse while
the ex-spouse is still alive (this prevents the system from creating an incentive for divorce). 
Moreover, the system provides no benefits to divorced spouses from marriages that lasted fewer
than 10 years.  In contrast, our PRA plan splits the accounts of the two spouses at the time of
divorce regardless of the length of the marriage, and therefore often results in higher benefits.25   Ssdist.09012000.wpd
The poverty figures in columns 4 and 5 show that married couples that depend
exclusively on the Social Security or PRA benefits are less likely to be below poverty than the
unmarried retirees (widows, widowers, divorcees, and those who were never married).  The shift
from Social Security to the PRA benefit reduces the portion below poverty by much more among
these high poverty unmarried groups than among the married.  For example, while the proportion
of married women who would be in poverty on the basis of Social Security benefits alone falls
from 13 percent to 9 percent, the proportion of non-married women who would be in poverty
falls from 26 percent to 9 percent.
Women who become widowed or divorced at an early age are particularly vulnerable
under current Social Security rules. A woman who is widowed at 50 and who does not remarry
will receive benefits based on her own earnings record (which may have large gaps during child
raising years or may only begin at age 50) or on the limited earnings record of her husband, often
leaving her with relatively low benefits when she turns 65 . The PRA system provides her with
substantially more benefits when she retires because the amount in her husband’s account passes
to her if he dies before age 65 and accumulates value through the investment return. 
The situation is similar for women who become divorced at an early age and do not
remarry.  The combination of account splitting at the time of divorce and the long period over
which to earn investment returns generally results in higher benefits than they receive under
Social Security.
This advantage of the PRA system is shown in the row marked Early Widows and
Divorcees which refers to women who were widowed or divorced before the age of 50 and not
remarried before retirement. We combine the young widows and young divorcees for this26   Ssdist.09012000.wpd
calculation because the sample of each taken separately would be too small. Their mean benefit
under current Social Security rules would be only $8,249 while their PRA annuities would be
$22,044,  a ratio of 2.67 and therefore substantially higher than the ratio for married men and
women. 99 per cent of the PRA annuities of these young widows and divorcees would exceed the
Social Security benefits that they would get under current rules.  The percentage of “young
widow and divorcees” whose benefits at retirement age are below the poverty line declines from
46 percent under current rules to 15 percent in the PRA system.
Table IIa also presents separate results for whites, blacks and Hispanics. All three groups
gain substantially from the switch, even those who are divorced, widowed, or never married. 
The mean gain is larger for whites than for blacks but the reduction of the proportion of retirees
who are potentially in poverty is greatest among blacks, a decline from 53 percent to 21 percent
among unmarried blacks. Thus the shift to the PRA system is potentially much more important
for blacks than it is for whites in combating poverty in old age. 
Another way of assessing how the shift would affect different socio-economic groups is
to compare the potential effect on households with different primary earner education levels.  All
three of the education groups enjoy a more than doubling of mean benefits both when married
and single, but the relative gain is lower among those with a college education (2.02 when
married and 2.27 with unmarried) than among those with a high school education (2.15 and 2.59)
or those with less than a high school education (2.03 and 2.48).  The reduction in poverty is
greatest among the unmarried with less than a high school education; the proportion that
potentially receives less than the poverty level falls from 35 percent to 13 percent among those
with less than a high school education. 27   Ssdist.09012000.wpd
The greater relative gain among those with less than a college education is surprising at
first since it is natural to think that the lower educated group would have lower incomes and
therefore, given the nature of the Social Security rules,  would have higher benefits relative to
previous earnings (and therefore to PRA benefits) than those with more education and earnings.
The contrary observed result may reflect the greater likelihood that married college attendees are
more likely to be in a couple where the wife receives benefits as a spouse rather than as a retired
worker, a situation that raises the value of Social Security benefits relative to lifetime earnings.
The college educated group also has lower age-specific mortality rates, increasing the expected
number of years of benefits.
Table IIb presents results by lifetime income, defined as the Average Indexed Monthly
Earnings (AIME) of the higher earner in the household.  The overall pattern suggests that the
reductions in potential poverty are the greatest in the lower income quintiles, while upper-income
households have the largest proportional gains from switching to a PRA system.  This
classification must be regarded with great caution, however,  since many of those who are
classified as in the lowest quintile on the basis of their covered earnings may have worked for
state governments or for the federal government for much of their life and have not actually had
low incomes.  The distributional results are therefore more meaningful for higher income
quintiles. Education and race may also be better ways to assess how the reform would affect
those with lower lifetime earnings.   Finally, it is important to emphasize that all income groups
benefit substantially from the shift, and that the reductions in potential poverty are largest for
those most at risk.
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We now go beyond the comparison of the mean benefits and other summary statistics for
each of the demographic groups that are shown in Table I to examine how each of the individuals
in our sample would do under the two systems.  Figure 1 compares the simulated annual annuity
benefits from the PRA accounts (the vertical axis) to the simulated annual social security benefits
under current law (the horizontal account) for all beneficiaries. As in Table IIa, the PRA benefits
are based on a contribution of 9 percent of earnings, approximately 58 percent of the 15.4 percent
payroll tax that would be required to finance the pay-as-you-go OASI Social Security benefits for
those who retire in 2075.   Each point in the figure represents an individual in the sample
weighted to represent the population sampling weight and the survival probabilities, as described
in section 2 of this paper.  To conform to Census restrictions on disclosing information on
individuals, each point has been slightly modified from the actual location by adding random
noise, a process known as “random jittering” in the statistical literature. This procedure does not
change the overall appearance of the figure in a perceptible way. Note that the scale of the two
axes is different; the annual Social Security benefits (horizontal scale) range from zero to
$20,000 per beneficiary while the PRA annuities for the same individuals range from zero to
$60,000.  
The ray from the origin represents equal values of simulated Social Security benefits and
simulated PRA annuities.  Any point above the line corresponds to an individual who would
receive more from the PRA system based on a 9 percent contribution rate  than from the Social
Security system despite the substantially higher 15.4 percent tax rate.  The figure illustrates the
statistic in Table II that nearly all  individuals would receive more from the PRA system than
from the Social Security system. 26Some individuals who appear to be eligible for SSI payments to not take up their SSI
benefits. McGarry (this volume) discusses this issue.
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The figure goes beyond that summary statistic by showing the Social Security benefit
level and the PRA annuity of each individual in our sample who would gain or lose in the shift to
a prefunded system and the magnitude of the net gain or loss. It is clear that most of those who
appear to lose from the shift are individuals with relatively low Social Security benefits.  It is
significant therefore to consider the role that Supplemental Security Income (SSI) would play in
supplementing both the regular Social Security benefits and the PRA annuities. SSI is a federal
government program that currently provides means tested supplemental benefits so that the
combination of regular Social Security benefits, other income (from assets, pensions, and work)
and the SSI benefit together provide a specified minimum income.  Since our figures are
benchmarked to 1999 income levels, the relevant SSI amounts are $6000 per year for a single
individual and $9012 per year for a couple.  This implies that incomes below $4506 per person in
married couples and $6000 for unmarried individuals should not be observed under either the
Social Security system or the PRA system.
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To show the implication of this in a clear way, Figure 2 repeats the points in figure 1 for
married individuals and adds vertical and horizontal lines corresponding to the federal SSI
guarantee level (i.e., $4506); to make the points clearer we limit the range to individuals with
Social Security benefits up to $12,000 per person. No point inside this SSI box would be
observed in practice. Note that some individuals with Social Security benefits at or below the SSI
level will have PRA benefits above that level and some with Social Security benefits above the
SSI level will receive only the SSI level of benefits under the PRA program.  The diagonal line27  If a beneficiary had sufficient other income to be ineligible for SSI, then it would be
possible for a person with a point in the bottom right portion of the SSI box to have lower
income in a PRA system than under Social Security.  But no one would end up with total income
below the federal SSI standard.  The cost of the SSI program would also be reduced since the
PRA benefits would raise the incomes of many of those who now qualify for SSI benefits.
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from the origin still shows the equal value combinations of Social Security benefits and PRA
annuity payments, but any point inside the SSI box will be raised to the SSI level. 
Any point below the diagonal line but inside the SSI box will not correspond to lower
benefits under the actual PRA system because of the SSI supplement. The key point to note is
that in the presence of the SSI guarantee there are very few points in which the PRA system
provides lower income than the Social Security system.
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Figure 3 shows the combinations of Social Security benefits and PRA annuity levels for
women who are not married at retirement age (i.e., are widowed, divorced or never married).  
There are very few points in which the PRA benefit would be less than the Social Security
benefit. When the benefit levels in the two systems are adjusted for SSI, i.e., each individual’s
retirement income has been adjusted up to the SSI level if it would otherwise be below, the small
number of potential losers is substantially reduced. Only those points that are outside the “SSI
box” and below the diagonal line would receive lower benefits. 
  The result is even more striking for “young” widows and divorcees (Figure 4) where
virtually all of the individuals in the sample would be better off under the PRA system than under
existing Social Security rules.
Figure 5 presents the same analysis for blacks.  Almost all of this group would get higher
retirement benefits under the PRA plan with a 9 percent contribution rate than under the Social
Security plan with the 15.4 percent tax rate, often very much higher.  While some of this group28It is important to emphasize that these rates of return are after the transition to the new
system is complete.  During part of the transition to the PRA system, contributions rates might be
higher under the PRA system than under the pay-as-you-go system.
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with low Social Security benefits would have even lower PRA annuities, this would rarely occur
in practice because of the SSI program. 
Figure 6 shows a similar analysis for individuals in households in which the primary
earner had less than a high school education. Again virtually everyone in this group would have a
higher retirement income in the PRA system and SSI would eliminate many of those shortfalls
that remain.
4. Taking Taxes into Account: Internal Rates of Return and Net Present Values
The analysis of section 3 focused on the benefits that individuals would receive under the
two systems.  Although we noted that the 9 percent long-run rate of contribution to the PRA
system would be substantially less than the corresponding 15.4 percent long-run tax required to
fund the pay-as-you-go system, our analysis did not take this into account explicitly.  We now
remedy that by comparing the internal rates of return and the net present values of different
population subgroups under the current Social Security rules with the rates of return and net
present values that those groups would have in the PRA system.
28 
The rate of return calculations for the PRA system are sensitive to the PRA annuity
assumptions and to the bequest rules.  All PRA balances are fully annuitized when the individual
reaches retirement.  Although an actuarially fair PRA system would give each individual the
same rate of return, we noted above that we assume that the PRA annuities would be calculated
using a single uniform unisex mortality table. The PRA system therefore gives a higher rate of
return to those groups that have higher life expectancies, a difference that is particularly29Recall that at the time of a divorce the PRA balances of the two individuals are
combined and divided equally between them.
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important in favoring women relative to men. With respect to bequests, we assume that a married
individual who dies before age 67 bequeaths his PRA balance to his spouse if he or she has one
and to someone else if there is no spouse.
The internal rate of return is calculated for each individual as follows.  For individuals
who are never married, we calculate the internal rate of return on the stream that begins with the
taxes paid by the individual and the individual’s employer at a combined 15.4 percent rate and
switches to the benefits that the individual receives in each year; with each year weighted by the
probability that the individual is alive at that age, using the age-sex-race-education mortality
probabilities described above. For married couples, one half of the combined payroll taxes paid
by the couple in each year that they are married is assumed to be paid by each individual (in years
in which the spouses were not married, the entire payroll tax is attributed to the spouse who paid
the tax).  When the individuals receive benefits as a couple, half of the total benefit in each year
is assumed to be received by each. When one of the couple dies, the remaining benefits are
attributed only to the surviving spouse.  The same procedure is followed for divorce: the
divorced individual is assumed to pay half of the couple’s combined payroll tax while married
and to receive the relevant benefits after divorce.
29  In each situation, the internal rate of return
for each individual in the couple is then based on these calculated tax payments and benefit
receipts. From the SIPP marriage topical module we observe annual marital status for each
individual including up to three marriages and divorces.  Rates of return are reduced to account
for the payroll taxes paid by cohort members who died before the time of the SIPP survey. 30This is the rate of return on Social Security contributions for the cohort that we study. 
Different cohorts would have different rates of return but,  after the baby-boom demographic
transition, all groups would receive approximately the rate of growth of  real money wages. 
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Implicitly, we assume that each deceased member of the cohort had earnings when they were
alive that were equal to the average earnings of a person in the same sex-age-race-education
subgroup.  Rates of return are increased to account for the bequests by cohort members who died
while single and before claiming benefits.  The full amount of the bequest is treated as a benefit
accruing to the sex-age-race-education subgroup of the decedent, and he or she is assumed to
have had a personal retirement account equal to the subgroup average for people of his or her
age.
Our estimates of the internal rate of return in each subgroup (and for all individuals) is
done for the aggregate taxes and benefits in the relevant subgroup.  Thus, individuals with higher
earnings and benefit levels receive more weight in the internal rate of return calculations.
For all participants in our sample, the switch from the pay-as-you-go system to the PRA
system raises the rate of return from about 1.4 percent in the unfunded Social Security system
30 to
5.5 percent in the PRA system. Although the differences between the two rates of return is
substantially greater for some population groups than it is for others, reflecting the redistribution
implied by the Social Security rules and the differences in PRA returns due to the use of a single
unisex mortality table for calculating the PRA annuity payments, it is also true that all of the
subgroups that we consider experience substantial rate of return increases.
Table III presents results for each of the subgroups for which an internal rate of return can
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race, and education.  We do not present results for marital status since it is not generally known
at age 21 and varies over an individual’s lifetime.
It is tempting to say that the groups with the biggest increase in rate of return benefit most
from the shift, and in some sense this is true.  But such a comparison does not take into account
the relative magnitudes of the tax and of the saving deposits under the two systems. A given rise
in the internal rate of return is worth more in absolute amount when the magnitude of the tax and
saving deposit is larger.  We therefore also present estimates of the net present value of the time
paths of payments and receipts for the Social Security and PRA systems. 
The first column of  Table III shows the internal rates of return of the current pay-as-you-
go Social Security system for different population subgroups. We use our age-sex-race-education
life tables to calculate the probability that each such person is alive to pay the tax in each year of
his or her working life and to receive the Social Security benefit at each age. Since we are
modeling the fully phased-in systems, we assume that the individuals (and their employers) pay
15.4 percent of their covered earnings in each year (from age 21 to their retirement age).   The
corresponding PRA calculations in column 2 assume that the individuals and/or their employers
contribute 9 percent of their covered earnings and receive a 5.5 percent net rate of return on their
contributions subject to the same mortality tables. 
Women receive a higher return under Social Security than men because of their greater
longevity and lower earnings; column one shows a return of 0.62 percent for men and 1.95
percent for women.  The difference between woman and men  increases slightly if we shift to the
PRA system: an increase of 4.04 percent for men (to 4.66 percent) and an increase of 4.29
percent for women (to 6.24 percent),  primarily reflecting the use of the unisex life table. 31As we explained above, these rates of return are based on the total taxes and benefits for
the population subgroup, i.e., these are the weighted average of the individual rates of return with
weights equal to the amount of taxes paid and benefits received.  A simple unweighted average
shows a much higher return for blacks that is more than twice the rate for whites.  See Liebman
(this volume) for more detail. 
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The results by race are quite interesting.  Whites and blacks receive essentially the same
rate of return under Social Security, with blacks receiving slightly less (1.27 percent) than whites
(1.36 percent).  Blacks do not receive a higher rate of return from Social Security despite their
lower incomes because of differences in mortality rates with blacks being more likely to die
before they receive any benefits and then, conditional on reaching age 65, to die earlier than
whites who reached that age. More specifically, if we look just at those who live to age 65 the
internal rate of return for blacks is slightly higher for whites, demonstrating how important
mortality before age 65 is in racial differences in returns.
31
Under the PRA, the gains for the two groups are very similar, with whites receiving
slightly higher rates of return than blacks because both groups are assumed to purchase annuities
at the same rates even though whites have a greater life expectancy.
Columns 3 through 8 contrast the net present value of the benefits and taxes for each of
these groups, using three alternative real discount rates. We regard the 3 percent real rate (used in
columns 5 and 6) as approximately the value that could be obtained after tax by an investor who
could invest in the PRA portfolio of stocks and bonds.  As a sensitivity test we repeat this
analysis for real discount rates of both one percent and five percent. All other things equal, a
group that has had higher incomes throughout its life will pay more payroll tax in the Social
Security program and make larger contributions in the PRA system; it will therefore have a larger
positive net present value (NPV) if its internal rate of return exceeds the discount rate and a36   Ssdist.09012000.wpd
larger negative net present value if its internal rate of return is less than the discount rate.
The first row shows that for the average participant the lifetime NPV of the pay as you go
Social Security system is negative ( minus $26,475) when discounting at 3 percent  (column 5). 
In contrast, with the PRA system the lifetime NPV for the average participant (shown in column
6)  is a positive $48,414.  With a one percent discount rate, both systems have positive present
values (columns 3 and 4) but the difference between the two widens: $186,992 in the PRA and
$11,510 with Social Security. A five percent discount rate makes the Social Security NPVs more
negative and reduces the NPV of the PRA system to a smaller  positive amount. The higher the
discount rate, the smaller the overall NPV difference between the two systems.  
As would be expected, the higher rates of return that women get in both the current Social
Security system and the PRA system translates into more favorable NPVs for women than for
men.  Results for the other demographic groups are similarly straight forward.
5. A Mixed System: Pay-as-You-Go plus Investment Based 
Although the pure investment based system that we examined in sections 3 and 4
provides a useful benchmark, it is not a realistic prospect for the United States.  The countries
that adopted pure investment based systems are ones in which the traditional pay-as-you-go
systems were generally  regarded by the public as bankrupt, corrupt, and in need of fundamental
reform.  That is not the situation in the United States.  The Social Security program is highly
regarded and the public is seeking a way of maintaining the system (“saving Social Security”)
without the large tax increase that would be required if the pure pay-as-you-go system continued. 
As we noted above, several countries now operate Social Security retirement systems that
include both traditional defined benefits financed on a pay-as-you-go basis with an investment32See Feldstein (1998) for discussions of such mixed systems in Australia and the United
Kingdom and Feldstein and Siebert (2001) for discussions of reform in Europe.
33  Both systems receive additional revenue from the taxation of benefits.  In the mixed
system, these revenues are used to continue to provide full (i.e. not reduced to 61 percent) DI
benefits.
37   Ssdist.09012000.wpd
based defined contribution benefit.
32  Proposals for such a hybrid system have been made in the
United States by academic researchers, advisory groups, and politicians. The proposal that we
examine in this section would maintain a pay as you go system with a tax of 12.4 percent of
payroll. An estimated three percent of the 12.4 percent (along with the revenue that is collected
from the taxation of benefits)  would be needed to continue the disability benefits provided in
current law as well as benefits for young survivors.  Since retirement benefits will require 15.4
percent of payroll in 2075, the 9.4 percent of the payroll tax that remains after providing for DI
would be sufficient to finance 61 percent of current law benefits.  This plan would supplement
these reduced pay-as-you-go benefits (implemented as an across-the-board reduction in all
retirement benefits) with a PRA system with contributions equal to 3 percent of covered
earnings, i.e. half of the 6 percent of earnings increase that would be required in the 15.4 percent
pure pay-as-you-go financing.
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Tables IVa and IVb show the effects of this mixed system for the same population
subgroups discussed above.  The resulting benefits for the mixed system are of course a hybrid of
the pure Social Security benefits shown in column 1 and the benefits that would result from a
pure PRA system (shown in column 2 of Table IIa). More specifically, the benefits shown in
column 2 of Table IV are approximately equal to 61 percent of the pure Social Security benefits
shown in column 1 of Table IIa (the ratio of the 9.4 percent current pay-as-you-go OASI tax to34On the impact of Social Security rules on immigrants, see Gustman and Steinmeier
(1998) and Liebman (this volume).
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the 15.4 percent that would be required in the pure Social Security system) plus three-ninths of
the 9 percent pure PRA benefits shown in column 2 of Table IIa.  
The relative gains among the different marital groups are qualitatively similar to the pure
case of Table II but more muted.  On average, beneficiaries see their per capita annual benefits
increase by $3,607 or 39 percent, despite the substantial reduction in the cost of financing the
combined package. The gain among married couples is around $2,600 per person, a 30 percent
rise over the traditional Social Security benefit. The relative gain is greater among the other
marital status groups: unmarried women gain 47 percent for example.  Potential poverty
reduction is also greatest among these groups; for women who are widowed, divorced, or never
married, the potential poverty rates are reduced from almost 25 percent with the current Social
Security law to 15 percent with the mixed system. Women gain more than men, a reflection of
the unisex life tables and the greater annuities received by widows. More specifically, the gains
average 30 percent for married men and 41 percent for unmarried men.  In contrast, married and
unmarried women gain 34 percent and 47 percent.  Those women who were widowed or
divorced by the age of 50 have an even greater relative gain, rising by 51 percent. The potential
poverty rate for this group is cut from over 45 percent to 21 percent.
Although whites gain more than blacks, the potential poverty reduction among blacks is
more substantial than among whites.  Hispanics gain relatively least because a substantial share
of the Hispanics in our sample are immigrants for whom the current Social Security rules
provides a very high return on contributions.
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impact on potential poverty, it is the unmarried blacks who benefit most with potential poverty
falling from 53 percent to 35 percent.  Hispanics benefit less because they have less time in the
country as PRA participants to benefit from the PRA accumulation.
When beneficiaries are classified by the education of the highest earner in the household,
the smallest proportional gain tends to go to those with more than a high school education. This
group with the highest education level does well under the traditional Social Security rules
because the wives in this group are most likely to receive benefits as spouses.  The less than high
school group also has the greatest gain when measured by the reduction in poverty.
When we examine income in Table IVb, we see that all groups gain, though the higher
quintiles receive the largest percentage increases in benefits.  The first two quintiles, however,
have the largest reductions in potential poverty.
5.1 Comparing Individual Benefits
More than 95 percent of the retirees would receive more from the mixed system than
from the pure Social Security system.  The proportion of gainers differs among the various
groups but exceeds 90 percent except for married Hispanics, whose gain is limited by the large
fraction of immigrants in this group. 
The scatter plots showing the way that individuals are affected are similar to the pure
PRA results shown in section 3 but with a reduced difference between the Social Security benefit
and the mixed system benefit for each individual.  Any point that is above the equal-benefit line
in the pure PRA scatter diagrams (implying that the PRA benefit exceeds the Social Security
benefit) will continue to be above the line in the mixed system but with the distance reduced. We
therefore present only four scatter diagrams for comparison with the earlier results. 40   Ssdist.09012000.wpd
Figure 7 shows the results for all beneficiaries.  The key things to notice are that most
people are above the equal benefit line, that the  points are more tightly clustered near the line
than they were before, and that the people who are below the line tend to be below by a very
small amount.
Figure 8 refers to women who are divorced or widowed before age 50 and who do not
remarry and can be compared to figure 4 in section 3. Virtually all of the points are above the
equal benefit line with only a handful of individuals who are both below the line and outside the
SSI box. 
Figure 9, for blacks, shows that almost all the points are above the line and the few that
are below are mostly at levels of income at which the individuals would be eligible for SSI.  In
short,  all of these individuals would be better off with the mixed system than with traditional
Social Security.
Finally, figure 10 shows that the results for the low education group (i.e., males with less
than a high school education) are similar.  The losses are small and mostly in the income range
where SSI would be available.  The gains for the gainers are substantially larger than the losses
for the losers.
5.2 Internal Rates of Return and NPVs in the Mixed System
Table V presents the internal rate of return and net present value calculations for the
mixed system and compares those calculations with the corresponding estimates for the pure
Social Security system.  The mixed plan produces an overall internal rate of return of 3.07
percent, reflecting the 1.4 percent on the pay-as-you-go portion and the 5.5 percent on the PRA
portion.  The differences among the subgroups follow the same pattern as they did for the pure41   Ssdist.09012000.wpd
PRA option but in a muted way. The gain in net present value (calculated as of age 21)  averages
$27,666 for all beneficiaries using a 3 percent discount rate.
6.  The Risk of Low Investment Returns
Our analysis until now has assumed that the PRA accounts earn a real return of 5.5
percent. We now examine the effects on different population subgroups and individuals of the
risk that the return earned in PRA accounts will be very much lower than it would have been in
the past. 
As we noted in section 3, the mean logarithmic real return on a balanced portfolio of 60
percent stock (the Standard and Poors 500) and 40 percent corporate bonds for the 50 year period
1946 through 1995 was 5.9 percent.  We subtract 0.4 percent for administrative costs to arrive at
the 5.5 percent that we used in these analyses. As we explained above, using the mean
logarithmic return understates the mean of the actual level returns by about one percentage point,
allowing a margin of safety for fluctuations in the investment return. A further reduction of
nearly one percentage point results from not extending the sample to 1999. 
Our examination in this section draws on the Feldstein and Ranguelova (1998) and
Feldstein, Ranguelova and Samwick (1999) analyses of the investment risks in an investment
based or mixed system. Those analyses showed that the benefits generated by a pure PRA system
with a six percent PRA saving rate or by a mixed system with a 2.3 percent PRA saving rate (and
continuation of the current pay-as-you-go tax rate) have a very high probability of exceeding the
traditional Social Security benefits.  Those calculations were for a representative agent with
average earnings and not for an actual sample of individuals of the type that we study here.
We now use the disaggregated sample data to examine whether there are some35More explicitly, we calculated the 3.5 percent as the average level return at the tenth
percentile of the 10,000 simulations of the portfolio return performed in Feldstein and
Ranguelova (1998). This 3.5 percent return can be compared to the 4.1 real return implicit in the
current price for Treasury Inflation Protected Securities and to the 3.0 percent interest rate
assumed by the Social Security Trustees as the future real return on Treasury bonds in the Social
Security Trust Fund.
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demographic groups that would be more adversely affected by investment risk than others. We
do not perform the same kind of full analysis of the complete distribution of returns that
Feldstein and Ranguelova did for the representative agent.  Instead we focus on a particular low
probability “pessimistic” scenario and evaluate the effects on different population groups if this
outcome occurs.  More specifically, we assume that instead of a 5.5 percent real rate of return the
PRA account earns only 3.5 percent.  Simulations based on the mean-variance experience from
1946 through 1995 implies that this would be at the tenth percentile of the probability
distribution of the annuity payments that would be earned by an individual who had contributed
in every year from age 21 through age 66.   Thus there is essentially a 90 percent probability
based on past experience with the variability of returns that the representative individual’s PRA
annuity would be greater than the PRA benefit based on a  3.5 percent return.
35 
We begin this analysis with the pure investment based case.  In our judgement this
involves more risk of benefit reductions than most individuals would want.  This risk could be
reduced or eliminated by the type of pay-as-you-go supplementary benefit (conditional on the
PRA portfolio return)  that is examined in Feldstein and Ranguelova (1998) and Feldstein,
Ranguelova and Samwick (1999). An alternative possibility is that a cohort that learns at age 45
or 50 that it has received an unusually low rate of return might decide to increase the PRA
savings above the nine percent, reducing the risk of shortfalls in retirement, while still paying43   Ssdist.09012000.wpd
substantially less than the 15.4 percent payroll tax that would be required in the pure pay-as-you-
go-system.
Alternatively, this risk might be reduced or eliminated by private options that provide
guarantees of minimum benefits in exchange for some reduction in average or maximum returns. 
We do not explore any of these ideas here. Nor do we discuss the role that a means tested
program like Supplemental Security Income might play.  Instead we discuss the pure investment
based system briefly and then turn to the more realistic mixed system. The reduced dependence
on the investment-based component in the mixed system substantially lowers the risk to
individuals. Other ways of reducing the shortfall below the Social Security benchmark and the
fraction of individuals whose benefits are below the poverty level are discussed in the next
section.
Table VIa shows that, with a 3.5 real rate of return, the mean PRA benefit for all retirees
would be $10,938, about 18 percent higher than the mean pay-as-you-go Social Security benefits.
Thus in more than 90 percent of the possible rate of return outcomes, the pure PRA system
would produce a mean benefit for all retirees that exceeds the corresponding mean of the
traditional Social Security benefits.  
Comparing the remaining rows of column 1 and 2 shows that even in this “tenth
percentile low return scenario” the mean PRA benefit exceeds the mean traditional Social
Security benefit in most demographic subgroup that we study (the exceptions are married blacks
and Hispanics and the bottom two income quintiles).  Thus among married couples the mean
benefit in this low return case would be roughly $8,900 per person ($17,800 per couple) or 7
percent more than the mean Social Security benefit.  For unmarried women, the relative gain is44   Ssdist.09012000.wpd
substantially greater: a 30 percent increase from $10,112 to $13,122  Although there are
differences among the groups, the key point is that even in this very poor performance case the
mean PRA benefit is higher than the mean Social Security benefit for almost every subgroup
even though the 15.4 percent tax rate is replaced by a 9 percent saving rate. 
Although the mean PRA benefits compare favorably with the mean Social Security
benefits, a significant fraction of  individuals would receive less in PRA benefits than they would
have received from Social Security. Among all the individuals in our sample, only 72 percent
would receive PRA benefits as large as their benchmark Social Security benefits; see column 3 of
table VIa.  The gap between PRA benefits and Social Security benefits in these cases is however
not large.   Among those with lower benefits under the PRA plan, 51 percent have benefits that
are within 15 percent of their benchmark Social Security benefits.  To put this reduction in
perspective, it is helpful to bear in mind that the 9 percent saving rate is equivalent to less than
two-thirds of the tax that would otherwise have to be paid for the Social Security benefits and
that the adverse effect shown in Table VI occurs only in the worst ten percent of possible
outcomes. 
Table VIIIa presents the results for the “10
th percentile low return scenario” in the mixed
system with PRA savings of three percent and a pay-as-you-go OASI tax rate unchanged at 9.4
percent. Despite this very poor investment performance, the overall average combined benefit
still exceeds the current law Social Security benchmark. Married men experience an average loss
of three percent while most unmarried subgroups  have higher means in the mixed PRA system
even with this lowest tenth percentile return.
The last two columns of Table VIIIa show that the impact of the shift on potential poverty36Recall that when both plans produce benefit levels below the SSI guarantee, the plans
are considered to provide equal benefits.   Under the mixed plan with low returns, SSI costs
would be higher than under the pay-as-you-go approach.  However, the additional costs would be
less than 2 percent of total retirement benefits.
45   Ssdist.09012000.wpd
is usually negligible in this case of the lowest 10
th percentile return.  Stated differently, if the
investment experience is better than the lowest 10
th percent of cases that can be expected on the
basis of the postwar record, there will be a reduction in the potential poverty among retirees.
The estimates in column three show that only 54 percent of beneficiaries would receive
benefits from the mixed system than were greater than or equal to the current law pay-as-you-go
in this worst tenth percentile case.
36  The differences however are usually fairly small. 87 percent
of the individuals with lower benefits under the mixed plan have benefits than are less than 15
percent below those in the current law Social Security system.
This is shown in figure 11 by the fact that almost all of the points lie very close to the
equal benefit line, with the more substantial departures above the line than below.   The
differences are not large and could again be offset by a conditional government payment that fills
the shortfall, by a mid-career adjustment in the cohort PRA saving rate, by private market
guarantee arrangements, or by modifying the PRA contributions in the way discussed in the next
section. 
7. Redistributive Funding of Personal Retirement Accounts
In previous sections we have shown that most of the time a PRA system that is funded
with contributions that are proportional to earnings can provide essentially all demographic and
income groups with a combination of higher benefit levels and lower levels of taxation than
would be available under a purely pay-as-you-go system.  Moreover, the reductions in potential37  The presence in our sample of government workers with low covered earnings
exaggerates the percentages of low-income workers relative to what we will expect to see in
future cohorts.  However, it does not have much impact on our estimates of the relative gains and
losses by workers at a given income level.
38 See Feldstein (1999) for a discussion of different distributive goals.
39  An alternative approach to protecting lower-income beneficiaries is to reduce the
traditional Social Security benefits by relatively less for this group.
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poverty are largest for the groups that are most at risk of poverty.  Nonetheless, higher income
groups tend to receive benefit increases from a PRA system relative to the Social Security system
that are larger than those of lower income groups.
37  Furthermore, low lifetime-income workers
remain at greatest risk of falling into poverty if financial markets perform worse in the future
than they have historically. Although some analysts are concerned that an investment based
system would increase the inequality of benefits, it is important to emphasize that the plans that
we study in this paper produce an increase in the income of virtually all retirees and will likely
reduce rates of poverty among the elderly.
38
Redistributive funding of personal retirement accounts can increase the relative gains for
low-income households, and reduce the risk that lower-than-expected returns leaves them in
poverty.
39 A wide range of different funding formulas to do this have been suggested.  In this
section, we consider two simple funding formulas that have been discussed in the policy debate . 
We present options in the context of our mixed plan.  Therefore, we continue to assume  pay-as-
you-go benefits equal to 61 percent of current law benefits but replace the PRA savings equal to
3 percent of covered earnings with alternative contributions that have the same aggregate cost.40More accurately, one percent of the covered earnings of workers who meet the current
Social Security requirement of annual earnings of $3000 a year. Many individual account plans
require a minimum level of earnings to qualify for an annual contribution in order to reduce
administrative costs associated with very small accounts.  In the redistributive options that we are
discussing,  a minimum earning threshold is likely to be necessary to prevent people from
gaming the system by working for only a few hours during the year but still earnings a full
contribution.
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More specifically, one percent of covered earnings for each employee
40 has the same total cost as
$300 per worker (in 1999 dollars, indexed to average wages thereafter).   In the first option, the
individual accounts contributions are a flat amount of $900 per worker, while in the second the
annual contributions into the PRA  accounts are 1.5 percent of the worker’s covered earnings
plus $450.
Table X shows mean benefits by income quintile for Social Security and the three
different formulas for funding the personal retirement accounts under a 5.5 percent investment
return. Notice that under the accounts funded with 3 percent of covered earnings, the increase in
benefits relative to Social Security rises from 19 percent in the second quintile to 39 percent in
the fifth quintile among married couples, and from 38 percent in the second quintile to 55 percent
in the fifth quintile among the unmarried.  In contrast, the middle plan that mixes flat
contributions and earnings related contributions replicates the progressivity of Social Security –
with roughly equal percentage increases for each quintile: 28 percent for the second quintile , 30
percent for the fourth quintile, and 28 percent for the fifth quintile among married couples, and
from 52 percent in the second quintile to 48 percent in the fourth quintile, and 43 percent in the
fifth quintile among the unmarried.    The plan with flat contributions is substantially more
redistributive  than Social Security, increasing benefits by 37 percent in the second quintile, 23
percent in the fourth quintile, and only 17 percent in the fifth quintile among married couples.  A48   Ssdist.09012000.wpd
similar pattern occurs among the unmarried.  The relative increases for blacks and Hispanics are
quite a bit higher in the redistributive plans as well.
Table XI focuses on the poverty impact of the three plans in the case in which the market
performs poorly – a 3.5 percent return.  It is clear that the more redistributive plans reduce the
risk to the lowest income beneficiaries.  For example, under the proportional to earnings
approach, 19 percent of widowed, divorced, or never married individuals in the second quintile
have benefits below the poverty line if the market performs poorly.  In contrast, only 12 percent
have benefits below poverty in the 1.5 percent plus $450 plan, and only 9 percent in the $900 per
covered worker plan.
8. Conclusion
Investment-based Social Security reform provides a way to prevent the benefit cuts and
payroll tax increases that would otherwise be necessary, adjustments that would likely have
deleterious impacts on those who depend most heavily on Social Security.  Nonetheless, critics
of investment-based Social Security reforms have argued that by increasing the link between
earnings and benefits, this approach threatens the progressivity of the system and could lead to
additional poverty among the elderly.  This paper shows that this need not be the case.  We find
that essentially all demographic and income groups can benefit from an investment based system
with a lower saving rate than the projected long-run pay-as-you-go tax, and that the potential
reductions in poverty are the largest for those most at risk of ending up poor. A mixed system
that combines the investment-based accounts and pay-as-you-go benefits can achieve such
results, even if financial markets perform extremely poorly.  Finally, we show how alternative49   Ssdist.09012000.wpd
contributions to personal retirement accounts can enable an investment-based system to equal or
exceed the redistribution of the current Social Security system.
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Data Appendix
Our data set is created by matching the 1990 and 1991 panels of the Survey of Income
and Program Participation(SIPP)  to Social Security administrative records on earnings from
1951 through 1990  (the Summary Earnings Record -- SER) and benefit records from 1995 (the
Master Beneficiary Record -- MBR) for those same individuals. 
From the public use sample of the SIPP, we selected all individuals from the first wave of
each SIPP panel who were age 60 or above in 1990 (individuals who were 60 years or above at
the start of the 1990 panel, 61 years or above at the start of the 1991 panel).  We also used
variables on marital history from the wave-two topical module of the SIPP.   We included data
on spouses of people in the age range, even if they themselves were not in the age range.  Our
ultimate unit of observation is the individual, so a married couple with two individuals in the
appropriate age range would be counted as two observations.  However, for programming
purposes, married couples were stacked into one observation.  We then matched these
observations to the SER, and disgarded observations that did not match to earnings.
Next we created our cohort -- individuals who were born from 1925 through 1929.  We
chose 1929 as a cut off because it ensures that we can observe earnings through age 64 for
everyone in the sample (our earnings data extend through 1990).  We wanted as narrow an age
group as possible so that we would not have age groups that had already lost significant numbers
of Social Security beneficiaries due to death.  However, given our modest sample sizes, we
decided to use 5 birth years of data. We dropped individuals whose year of birth in the SER was
more than 5 years from their year of birth in the SIPP.   1  In some case, we were required to impute earnings at the beginning or end of the career
if the 1951-1993 period did not include all years from age 21 to age 64.
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For the never married and married individuals, the SIPP-SER match produced the
earnings data necessary for our simulation.
1  For previously married individuals, however, the
former spouse is not in our data set, so we do not have the spouse’s SER earnings record.   For
many of these individuals (those receiving spouse benefits, widow/er benefits, or dually entitled
worker benefits), we were able to obtain the former spouse’s Primary Insurance Amount (and
therefore their Average Index Monthly Earnings) by further matching to the MBR.  For the rest
(those receiving retired worker benefits only), we imputed a spouse PIA using the correlation
between respondent and spouse PIA for similar individuals from the New Beneficiary Survey --
an older sample that obtained earnings and benefit records for former spouses of sample
members.   We dropped disabled individuals (and couples with a disabled member) and
unstacked married couples so that each individual in the couple counts as an observation if both
spouses were members of the 1925 to 1929 birth cohort.  
Once we had a former spouse’s PIA for the previously married individuals, we calculated
an Average Indexed Monthly Earnings ( AIME) by inverting the Social Security benefit formula.
We then calculated (separately for men and women) the average share of earnings earned in each
year for people in our sample with earnings histories (separately for men and women), and
generated an earnings record for the missing spouses by spreading their AIME according to the
average share of earnings earned in each year, subject of course to the constraint that a former
spouse of a widow or widower could not have earnings in years after his or her death.52   Ssdist.09012000.wpd
The earnings data report earnings only up to the taxable maximum for the year.  In the
past, the taxable maximum was much lower relative to average earnings than it is today.  In order
to be able to simulate the current Social Security rules, we imputed a level of earnings above the
taxable maximum for sample members with earnings at the taxable maximum.  We did this by
estimating a two-limit tobit regressed on a constant (i.e. with no other independent variables)
separately for men and women for each year between 1951 and 1990. The level of earnings is fit
very well by a normal distribution until a percentile that is above the current taxable maximum. 
The regressions produced an estimate for mean earnings and a regression error.  Using these
parameter estimates, we randomly drew from a normal distribution will the appropriate mean and
variance until each topcoded observation was replaced with a draw above the topcode.
Based on the sample member’s earnings history and the earnings history of the spouse,
we calculated Social Security benefits.  Our calculations incorporate nearly all of the retirement
benefit provisions, including covered worker requirements, the minimum benefit, spouse
benefits, survivor benefits, and reductions for claiming benefits before the normal retirement age. 
We do not simulate the delayed retirement credit (instead assuming that everyone in our sample
claims benefits by age 65), nor do we have adequate information to implement government
pension offset provisions. 53   Ssdist.09012000.wpd
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Social Security Administration (1999).  Information on the Distributional Effects of 
Various Social Security Solvency Options by Gender and Income. Table 1
Characteristics of Sample
1925-1929 cohorts 
at time of 




Male 46.1 % 41.0%
Female 53.9 % 59.0%
Married (including separated) 73.7 % 52.8%
Widowed 13.6% 38.0%
Divorced 8.6 % 5.8%
Never married 4.1% 3.4%
White (and other) 92.4% 93.2%
Black 7.6% 6.8%
Hispanic (can be either race) 4.3% 4.0%
Less than high school 30.8% 28.8%
High school 53.5% 55.5%
More than High school 15.9% 15.6%
Age 60-61 NA 2.4%
Age 62-64 NA 10.7%
Age 65-75 NA 40.0%
Age 75-85 NA 29.2%
Age 85+ NA 17.6%
Unweighted sample size 2,720 Up to 41 benefit
years x 2,720
Weighted sample size 3.424 million 
(per birth year)
71.156 millionTable IIa







Percent with retirement benefits











All beneficiaries 9,291 21,414 97.9  18.9 9.2
Married Couples
Men 8,425 17,152 97.8 13.7 9.2
Women 8,185 17,582 97.2 13.5 9.1
Whites 8,413 17,657 97.6 12.9 8.5
Blacks 6,229 10,850 96.1 29.5 22.6
Hispanics 5,896 9,123 86.4 38.7 31.4
Less than high school 7,613 15,476 97.5 16.5 12.0
High school  8,227 17,652 98.1 13.4 8.9
College and above 9,440 19,074 96.3 10.5 6.2
Widowed, Divorced, and Never Married
Men 11,120 26,264 98.7 22.4 8.7
Women 10,112 25,837 98.1 25.6 9.4
     Early widow/divorce 8,249 22,044 99.0 45.8 14.6
Whites 10,673 26,933 98.2 21.8 8.0
Blacks 7,562 16,484 98.9 53.3 20.5
Hispanics 7,961 18,316 95.2 46.8 27.3
Less than high school 9,135 22,684 98.4 34.5 12.8
High school  10,932 28,329 98.8 18.9 6.2
College and above 12,475 28,316 95.7 13.3 7.9Table IIb







Percent with retirement benefits














3,899 5,189 92.8 71.4 49.9
Second Quintile 6,610 11,270 94.4 13.8 7.3
Third Quintile 8,504 16,871 97.6 3.9 2.7
Fourth Quintile 9,462 21,339 99.8 2.2 1.6
Highest Quintile 10,478 24,240 100.0 1.9 1.3
Widowed, Divorced, and Never Married
Lowest Lifetime Income
Quintile
5,414 9,651 96.0 94.1 41.7
Second Quintile 9,310 21,196 98.3 18.7 1.0
Third Quintile 11,564 29,521 97.8 1.8 1.5
Fourth Quintile 12,947 35,819 99.9 0.0 0.0
Highest Quintile 14,722 41,210 100.0 0.0 0.0Table III
Comparison of IRRs and NPVs from 9 Percent PRA and Social Security





PRAs Funded With 
9 % of Payroll 
(5.5% Rate of
Return)








All beneficiaries 1.35 5.54 11,510 186,992  -26,475 48,414 -31,911 5,176
Men 0.62 4.66 -11,323 132,172 -36,166 28,484 -36,895 -2,975
Women 1.95 6.24 32,554 237,515 -17,543 66,782 -27,318 12,688
Whites 1.36 5.55 12,070 194,859 -27,328 50,487 -32,987 5,458
Blacks 1.27 5.38 5,461 101,982 -17,257 26,013 -20,285 2,126
Hispanics 1.81 5.71 16,572 113,596 -11,835 29,881 -16,783 3,901
Less than high
school
1.32 5.49 8,439 150,566 -22,658 39,020 -27,142 3,899
High school  1.39 5.62 13,470 206,310 -27,660 54,046 -33,768 6,408
College and above 1.30 5.34 11,114 196,585 -30,536 48,521 -35,614 3,493Table IVa







Percent with retirement benefits









Security Mixed  Plan
All beneficiaries 9,291 12,898 96.2 18.9 13.1
Married Couples
Men 8,425 10.941 96.3 13.7 12.2
Women 8,185 10,935 95.0 13.5 11.2
Whites 8,413 11,102 95.7 12.9 11.1
Blacks 6,229 7,478 95.8 29.5 25.8
Hispanics 5,896 6,696 78.7 38.7 33.0
Less than high school 7,613 9,879 95.9 16.5 14.6
High school  8,227 10,984 95.9 13.4 11.3
College and above 9,440 12,211 95.0 10.5 9.0
Widowed, Divorced, and Never Married
Men 11,120 15,649 97.4 22.4 12.9
Women 10,112 14,882 96.5 25.6 15.4
     Early widow/divorce 8,249 12,462 98.1 45.8 25.1
Whites 10,673 15,595 96.7 21.8 12.6
Blacks 7,562 10,183 97.9 53.3 34.8
Hispanics 7,961 11,041 91.7 46.8 40.0
Less than high school 9,135 13,225 97.2 34.5 21.7
High school  10,932 16,221 97.6 18.9 9.4
College and above 12,475 17,173 92.6 13.3 10.3Table IVb







Percent with retirement benefits













3,899 4,147 89.1 71.4 63.7
Second Quintile 6,610 7,855 88.9 13.8 9.9
Third Quintile 8,504 10,896 95.7 3.9 3.1
Fourth Quintile 9,462 12,979 99.5 2.2 2.0
Highest Quintile 10,478 14,576 100.0 1.9 1.8
Widowed, Divorced, and Never Married
Lowest Lifetime Income
Quintile
5,414 6,574 94.1 94.1 66.9
Second Quintile 9,310 12,838 95.7 18.7 3.0
Third Quintile 11,564 17,010 96.1 1.8 0.8
Fourth Quintile 12,947 19,967 99.8 0.0 0.0
Highest Quintile 14,722 22,864 100.0 0.0 0.0Table V
Comparison of IRRs and NPVs from Mixed Plan and Social Security
Internal Rate of Return
















All beneficiaries 1.35 3.07 11,510 71,991  -26,475 1,191 -31,911 -17,154
Men 0.62 2.27 -11,323 39,809 -36,166 -11,301 -36,895 -22,853
Women 1.95 3.71 32,554 101,651 -17,543 12,705 -27,318 -11,902
Whites 1.36 3.07 12,070 74,695 -27,328 1,214 -32,987 -17,801
Blacks 1.27 3.09 5,461 42,779 -17,257 941 -20,285 -10,162
Hispanics 1.81 3.38 16,572 50,282 -11,835 3,814 -16,783 -8,408
Less than high
school
1.32 3.05 8,439 58,577 -22,658 748 -27,142 -14,459
High school  1.39 3.12 13,470 79,425 -27,660 2,223 -33,768 -17,951
College and above 1.30 2.91 11,114 74,356 -30,536 -1,592 -35,614 -20,169Table VIa







Percent with retirement benefits




PRAs Funded With 9






All beneficiaries 9,291 10,938 72.1 18.9 21.5
Married Couples
Men 8,425 8,796 64.4 13.7 20.0  
Women 8,185 9,007 69.6   13.5 20.2
Whites 8,413 9,047 67.5 12.9 19.0
Blacks 6,229 5,639   51.6 29.5 43.3
Hispanics 5,896 4,836 47.4 38.7 53.0
Less than high school 7,613 7,913 63.6 16.5 23.7
High school  8,227 8,993 68.5 13.4 20.8
College and above 9,440 9,935 66.8 10.5 13.7
Widowed, Divorced, and Never Married
Men 11,120 13,491 72.3 22.4 21.3
Women 10,112 13,122 80.1 25.6 23.8
     Early widow/divorce 8,249 10,602 77.4 45.8 36.4
Whites 10,673 13,715 78.4 21.8 20.2
Blacks 7,562 8,453 74.1 53.3 27.6
Hispanics 7,961 9,368 72.2 46.8 53.5
Less than high school 9,135 11,478 78.7 34.5 31.5
High school  10,932 14,400 79.4 18.9 17.5
College and above 12,475 14,784 71.2 13.3 15.8Table VIb
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PRAs Funded With 9









3,899 2,593 61.6 71.4 92.5
Second Quintile 6,610 5,812 32.5 13.8 32.9
Third Quintile 8,504 8,649 51.1 3.9 6.4
Fourth Quintile 9,462 10,946 81.9 2.2 2.2
Highest Quintile 10,478 12,430 90.0 1.9 1.9
Widowed, Divorced, and Never Married
Lowest Lifetime Income
Quintile
5,414 4,827 75.9 94.1 84.5
Second Quintile 9,310 10,845 63.5 18.7 19.4
Third Quintile 11,564 15,063 78.5 1.8 2.9
Fourth Quintile 12,947 18,323 90.9 0.0 0.0
Highest Quintile 14,722 20,903 91.8 0.0 0.0Table VII
Comparison of IRRs and NPVs from PRA Plan with Lower Return and Social Security
Internal Rate of Return





PRAs Funded With 
9 % of Payroll 
(3.5% Rate of
Return)
1% discount rate 3% discount rate 5 % discount rate
SS 9% PRA SS 9% PRA  SS
9% PRA
All beneficiaries 1.35 3.53 11,510 69,640 -26,475 6,981 -31,911 -10,192
Men 0.62 2.66 -11,323 40,574 -36,166 -4,081 -36,895 -15,068
Women 1.95 4.22 32,554 96,427 -17,543 17,176 -27,318 -5,698
Whites 1.36 3.53 12,070 72,577 -27,328 7,337 -32,987 -10,538
Blacks 1.27 3.41 5,461 37.903 -17,257 3,139 -20,285 -6,452
Hispanics 1.81 3.67 16,572 43,381 -11,835 5,150 -16,783 -5,240
Less than high
school
1.32 3.47 8,439 55,291 -22,658 5,061 -27,142 -8,817
High school  1.39 3.61 13,470 77,621 -27,660 8,645 -33,768 -10,429
College and above 1.30 3.35 11,114 72,065 -30,536 5,133 -35,614 -12,350Table VIIIa
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Security Mixed  Plan
All beneficiaries 9,291 9,406 53.7 18.9 20.8
Married Couples
Men 8,425 8,156 39.0 13.7 17.5
Women 8,185 8,077 50.1 13.5 17.9
Whites 8,413 8,232 44.5 12.9 16.7
Blacks 6,229 5,741 35.4 29.5 38.9
Hispanics 5,896 5,267 37.1 38.7 48.5
Less than high school 7,613 7,358 40.5 16.5 21.2
High school  8,227 8,098 49.0 13.4 17.9
College and above 9,440 9,165 36.9 10.5 12.4
Widowed, Divorced, and Never Married
Men 11,120 11,392 54.7 22.4 22.5
Women 10,112 10,643 68.1 25.6 25.0
     Early widow/divorce 8,249 8,648 69.8 45.8 41.8
Whites 10,673 11,189 64.7 21.8 21.5
Blacks 7,562 7,506 62.9 53.3 51.6
Hispanics 7,961 8,058 62.5 46.8 53.0
Less than high school 9,135 9,490 66.0 34.5 33.3
High school  10,932 11,578 66.6 18.9 18.6
College and above 12,475 12,663 53.0 13.3 14.8Table VIIIb
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3,899 3,282 59.6 71.4 87.9
Second Quintile 6,610 6,035 16.9 13.8 23.7
Third Quintile 8,504 8,155 27.4 3.9 4.9
Fourth Quintile 9,462 9,515 52.1 2.2 2.2
Highest Quintile 10,478 10,639 59.4 1.9 1.9
Widowed, Divorced, and Never Married
Lowest Lifetime Income
Quintile
5,414 4,966 68.0 94.1 92.5
Second Quintile 9,310 9,387 48.7 18.7 18.6
Third Quintile 11,564 12,191 67.6 1.8 1.6
Fourth Quintile 12,947 14,135 75.6 0.0 0.0
Highest Quintile 14,722 16,095 70.6 0.0 0.0Table IX
Comparison of IRRs and NPVs from Mixed Plan with Lower Return and Social Security
Internal Rate of Return
















All beneficiaries 1.35 2.12 11,510 32,797 -26,475 -12,658 -31,911 -22,297
Men 0.62 1.35 -11,323 9,241 -36,166 -22,174 -36,895 -26,893
Women 1.95 2.74 32,554 54,507 -17,543 -3,889 -27,318 -18,060
Whites 1.36 2.12 12,070 33,862 -27,328 -13,205 -32,987 -23,152
Blacks 1.27 2.22 5,461 21,288 -17,257 -6,750 -20,285 -13,055
Hispanics 1.81 2.49 16,572 26,794 -11,835 -4,470 -16,783 -11,476
Less than high
school
1.32 2.11 8,439 26,694 -22,658 -10,635 -27,142 -18,729
High school  1.39 2.16 13,470 36,466 -27,660 -12,943 -33,768 -23,579
College and above 1.30 2.00 11,114 32,830 -30,536 -16,065 -35,614 -25,455Table X
Comparison of Benefits Levels Under Different Redistributive Funding Options 





















3,899 4,147 4,856 5,564
Second Quintile 6,610 7,855 8,447 9,040
Third Quintile 8,504 10,896 10,809 10,722
Fourth Quintile 9,462 12,979 12,330 11,680
Highest Quintile 10,478 14,576 13,433 12,290
Whites 8,413 11,102 10,783 10,464
Blacks 6,229 7,478 8,128 8,778
Hispanics 5,896 6,696 7,219 7,741
Widowed, Divorced, and Never Married
Lowest Lifetime Income
Quintile
5,414 6,574 8,422 10,270
Second Quintile 9,310 12,838 14,129 15,420
Third Quintile 11,564 17,010 17,195 17,380
Fourth Quintile 12,947 19,967 19,115 18,263
Highest Quintile 14,722 22,864 20,981 19,099
Whites 10,673 15,595 15,819 16,044
Black 7,562 10,183 11,770 13,357
Hispanics 7,961 11,041 12,028 13,014Table XI
Comparison of  Retirement Benefits to Poverty Level Under Different Redistributive Funding Options 
for Personal Retirement Accounts in the Mixed Plan with a 10
th Percentile Return




















71.4 87.9 78.6 71.9
Second Quintile 13.8 23.7 21.0 20.0
Third Quintile 3.9 4.9 5.3 6.5
Fourth Quintile 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.5
Highest Quintile 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0
Whites 12.9 16.7 15.3 14.7
Blacks 29.5 38.9 31.9 29.1
Hispanics 38.7 48.5 38.8 36.6
Widowed, Divorced, and Never Married
Lowest Lifetime Income
Quintile
94.1 92.5 85.2 68.0
Second Quintile 18.7 18.6 12.4 9.3
Third Quintile 1.8 1.6 0.8 1.5
Fourth Quintile 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Highest Quintile 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Whites 21.8 21.5 18.4 14.7
Black 53.3 51.6 45.6 36.8
Hispanics 46.8 53.0 47.8 36.3Figure 1
The points have been randomly jittered to preserve confidentiality.
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Simulated Annual Social Security BenefitsFigure 2
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